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 The main danger of DRG payment to hospitals is selection against high-risk 
patients.  
 Heterogeneity by SES within DRG groups is not accounted by the Australian 
reform. 
 We find significant effects of the SES variables on the use of inpatient resources as 
the lower the SES the longer the length of stay. 
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Financing in Australia’s public hospital works through the Australian Refined 
Diagnosis Related Groups (AR-DRGs) with separations to specific DRG groups 
based on medical diagnosis or surgical procedure, patient’s age, mode of separation, 
clinical complexity and complications. This paper aims at assessing how the AR-
DRGs reflect the efficiency and equity of the hospitals resource allocation. Using 
administrative data of all acute public hospital admissions and length of stay (LOS) as 
a proxy for hospital costs, this paper showed that patients’ socio-economic (SES) 
characteristics are a strong determinant of health care utilization. Our results revealed 
that the lower the SES, the longer the LOS and hence more utilization of the inpatient 
resources. Therefore, omitting SES from the risk adjusters list and solely focusing on 
DRG- based compensation penalizes hospitals catering to lower SES populations. Our 
findings further support the idea of smaller/remote hospitals based on block funding.  
 
 


















Risk-adjusted capitated payments to hospital networks create financial and higher-
powered incentives to promote allocative and dynamic efficiency. Capitated payments 
create incentives to provide appropriate array of hospital services to a defined 
population and also, incentives to liaise with other sectors in particular primary care, 
(i.e. primary care organizations - see below), in order to provide the most cost-
effective continuity of care (Segal et al, 2002). Public hospitals in Australia are paid 
based on an Activity-based funding that largely depends on a refined and tailored 
version of weighted, capitated and prospective payments, the Diagnosis Related 
Groups (DRGs) - namely the Australian Refined Diagnosis Related Groups (AR-
DRGs). In this paper, we examine to what extent the risk adjustment of the hospital 
ABF model in Australia, which is solely based on DRGs adjusters, reflects the 
efficiency and equity of the hospitals resource allocation. Furthermore, we examine 
the resource allocation efficiency, as approximated by the length of stay, based on the 
dataset of all publicly admitted patients in Australia in the 2007-08 financial year. 
Specifically, we argue that allocation of resources based on DRGs alone is not 
sufficient and other patients’ characteristics, socioeconomic status (SES) in particular, 
must be reflected in the hospitals compensation formula. In this introduction section, 
we will provide a synopsis of the Australian health financing system, followed by a 
brief of how the DRGs systems work in general and in Australia. Also, key reforms 
regarding hospital payment methods in Australia will be highlighted. 
 
The Australian Health Care System  
The Australian health care system has been designed to achieve a high level of equity 
in treatment. Universal access and coverage are provided through a number of 
publicly financed programs collectively known as Medicare. Introduced in 1984, the 
Medicare universal arrangements are financed principally out of general taxation and 
a specific health levy of 1.5% of taxable income (and additional Medicare levy of 
2.5% for high income earners who do not take out private health insurance). All 
Australians are entitled to a level of subsidies for medical services (i.e. privately or 
publicly provided) such as GP and specialists visits under the Medical Benefits 
Schedule (MBS) which is funded by the Commonwealth government. Also, under the 















governments to fund public hospital services whereby all Australians are able to 
access public hospitals free at the point of delivery.  
A significant feature of the Australian health system is the division of responsibilities 
and powers between Commonwealth and State governments in the funding and 
provision of health care services. The Commonwealth government is directly 
responsible for financing medical services, and pharmaceutical benefits, as described 
above, and jointly with State governments funds public hospital services. State and 
territory governments with varying financial assistance from the Commonwealth have 
been primarily responsible for the managing of public hospitals, mental health 
programs and community health services. Since the early 1990s, most state 
governments have moved towards funding hospitals under a prospective case-mix 
system based on a classification system of treatment complexity known as Diagnosis-
Related Groups (DRGs).  
  
Diagnosis Related Groups in Australia 
Implementation of a DRG-based payment system requires in brief, four building 
blocks: (a) a clinical classification system to group patients into similar clinically 
homogenous characteristics clusters (kobel, Thuilliez, Bellanger & Pfeiffer, 2011; 
Klein-Hitpaß and Scheller-Kreinsen, 2015), (b) a pattern of hospitals’ cost 
information to assess the DRGs weights and points (Tan et al., 2011; Cots, Chiarello, 
Salvador, Castells & Quentin, 2011), (c) a conversion of the DRGs points to monetary 
values that are subject to adjustment according to structural (i.e. location, wages level) 
and resource-consumption variables (i.e. length of stay, service utilization) (Cots et 
al., 2011; Klein-Hitpaß and Scheller-Kreinsen, 2015) and finally (d) payment to take 
place according to the number and weight of DRGs (Busse, 2012). The advantage of 
the DRG-based payment system stems from reimbursing providers based on 
prospective inputs, which are required to manage and treat a specific group. Thus, it 
incentivizes service providers to provide more efficient services and curb unnecessary 
services (unnecessary long length of stay) (Cylus & Irwin, 2010). Nevertheless, few 
inadvertent implications result from the scheme such as: cream skimming of low-risk 
patients (Cylus & Irwin, 2010); DRG creep (i.e. where providers place patients into 
higher points DRGs (Serdén, Lindqvist & Rosén, 2003; Pongpirul & Robinson, 2013)) 
and inadequacy in the quality of case management (leading to higher rates of 















However, notwithstanding adoption of case-mix classification for funding hospitals, 
the total funding from which payments are made is still derived from capped budgets. 
Thus, whilst all hospitals are ostensibly paid the same based on their case-mix 
complexity of episodes of treatment, the funding pool of State resources (with the 
exception of NSW, see NSW Health, 2005; Rice and Smith, 2001) is not based on a 
needs-adjusted capitated basis either at a person-level or at an aggregated regionally-
defined population basis. 
  
The complex division of responsibilities in funding and provision of healthcare 
services between Commonwealth and State governments have resulted in a highly 
fragmented and uncoordinated health system structure. This fragmented and ad hoc 
approach to health system funding and resource allocation has led to calls over the 
past decade in Australia to consolidate all public funding into single funding stream; 
and the adoption of risk-adjusted capitation to allocate funds to area-based purchasing 
authorities based on the health care needs of the defined population (Podger, 2005; 
FitzGerald, 2005; Richardson, 2005; Richardson, 2003; Peacock & Segal, 2000). 
These calls have culminated with the Federal government introducing a number of 
major reform initiatives to improve efficiency and fairness in the allocation of 
resources in the public hospital system. 
  
Hospital Payment Scheme Reforms in Australia 
In April 2010, the Federal government reached a historic agreement with state 
governments to adopt key structural reforms to the governance, funding and delivery 
of health services. Under the National Health and Hospital Network (NHHN) reforms 
the federal government become co-funder (50%) of public hospital services; take full 
funding and policy responsibility in primary health care services; and take full 
funding and policy responsibilities in aged care services (NHHN, 2010a). A key 
structural change is the establishment of Local Hospital Networks (LHN) as a 
separate legal entity, involving the clustering of a small group of public hospitals with 
defined geographical and functional areas of responsibility. State governments are 
responsible for system-wide planning and monitoring of public hospitals, but LHN are 
given flexibility in how to best meet its locally-derived service requirements. LHN 
funding is based on a nationally consistent approach to activity-based funding (ABF) 















The new national ABF is managed through an inter-governmental agency, with 
emergency and sub-acute services funded on a similar basis as classifications and 
costs are finalized overtime (Mihailovic et al., 2016). In terms of funding 
arrangements, an Independent Hospital Pricing Authority (IHPA) determines the 
(single) national ‘efficient price’, representing the Australian Government’s payments 
to public hospital and sub-acute services determined on activity-based funding 
arrangements across Australia. According to the Report by Health Policy Solutions, 
Case-mix Consulting & Aspex Consulting (2011), the AR-DRGs (Version 6.Ox) are 
used for inpatient services classifications. According to the same report, the new 
prospective payment system with a case-mix basis aims at reducing the in-patient 
length of stay (LOS) and the subsequent non-medical costs.  
 
The new hospital financing scheme raises some equity concerns related to the 
emergence of some forms of implicit (or even explicit) selection of patients after the 
implementation of nationally homogeneous prospective payments systems in other 
countries (see Perelman, Shmueli & Closon, 2008 and references therein). If 
hospitals’ decisionmakers can observe heterogeneity in expected costs across patients’ 
subgroups and within a particular (risk-)group of patients, for which the risk-adjusted 
payment per admission is the same, selection may occur. Selection is thus a 
consequence of the imperfect risk adjustment of prospective payments. The 
implications of imperfect risk adjustment on equity and efficiency are straightforward. 
Hospitals engaging in selection activities focus on attracting low-cost patients, with 
high-cost ones facing lower access to (high-quality) care (e.g. increased waiting 
times). Hospitals not practicing patients’ selection can suffer financial distress and 
potentially bankruptcy. In the long term, either those hospitals fail and access to care 
is at risk, or they decrease the quality of treatments and access to quality is at risk (van 
de Ven and Van Vliet, 1992, Perelman, Shmueli & Closon, 2008).  
 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the distinction between public and private 
hospitals in Australia. One way to make it simple is to differentiate between the 
accessibility to both types of hospital depending on the type of insurance. For 
instance, public insurance holder can access public hospitals as a public patient and 
receive medical services, free at point if delivery. On the other hand, private health 















as a ‘private’ patient where it is allowed to choose the preferred physician. Generally, 
private hospitals are also characterized with shorter waiting times while public 
hospitals are usually the first choice for emergency cases and also offer wider basket 
of services (Shmueli & Savage, 2014).   
 
It is important to note that the correlation between patients’ SES and the LOS has 
been investigated in the body of literature of hospital payment schemes and equity. 
Many studies have found substantial and significant impact of SES on LOS in other 
countries include Epstein, Stern, & Weissman (1990); Kominski & Long (1997); 
Martin & Smith (1996); Picone, Wilson & Chou, (2003); Perelman, Shmueli & 
Closon (2008); and Moore et al. (2015); Strobel et al. (2017); and Henry et al. (2018). 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the methods and include two 
subsections that describe data and analytic methods used in our analysis. Section 3 
summarises the results, and Section 4 provides the discussion and concludes. 
 
2. METHODS 
The data provided all hospitalization episodes during the financial year 2007-08 and 
was obtained from the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW). Our study 
focused on the following variables: length of stay (LOS) as the dependent variable, 
the Australian refined DRGs, number of affected systems, and socioeconomic and 
demographic factors. We worked on two frameworks to model the behaviour of the 
dependent variable, LOS, where the difference between the two frameworks was 
based on the type of treatment and number of days in hospital before discharge.  Both 
approaches as well as the data will be described in full in the below subsections. 
Subsection 2.1 will portray the data used in this study while subsection 2.2 will 
describe the analytical methods.   
 
2.1. DATA 
The data came from AIHW and covered all hospitalization episodes in Australia 
for the 2007-08 financial year with a total of 7.02 million observations.
1
 The study 
                                                 
1
 Difficulties in securing access to administrative data precludes us from updating to a more recent 
















concentrated on the acute care episodes only: 6.75 million observations, or 96.2 
percent of all data. We further limited the analysis to the publicly admitted 
patients which gives overall sample size of 3.65 million observations 
(approximately 47% of acute care episodes were classified as private patients). 
  
The originally available information is at the patient level only and includes some 
of the demographic, socio-economic and admission related characteristics. 
Demography covers age (in 5-year group brackets) and gender, while the first set 
of the socio-economic (SES) variables includes place of birth (Australia or 
overseas), whether a patient is of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander (ATSI) 
background and remoteness indicator (major city, inner-region, outer-region and 
remote/very remote). Available admission characteristics included length of stay 
(LOS), same-day discharge, Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) assigned for 
admission as well as a list of all (up to 50) accompanying diagnoses. 
  
The first set of the SES variables above was clearly limited. To expand the set, we 
utilized information from the diagnostic factors – the details are discussed below – 
and supplemented the patients’ SES characteristics with the second set based on 
the Z-codes from the diagnosis information: the latter identified whether there 
were any social and/or economic characteristics accompanying patient’s 
admission. The diagnoses information was also used to classify inpatients 
according to the number of affected systems. 
 
The data also completely lacked any hospitals identifiers and did not distinguish if 
an individual was hospitalized more than once. The first limitation constrained the 
possibility to control for the hospital-level fixed effects and the second limited the 
possibility to control for readmissions. 
  
Below we provide a brief description of the main variables in the analysis. Table 1 
summarizes the descriptive information for all variables. 
  
                                                                                                                                            
changed over time, the importance and relevance of the research question remains irrespective of the 















Length of Stay (LOS) 
The Length of Stay (LOS) was measured in number of nights and maximum LOS 
in the original dataset is truncated at 35. The average LOS is 2.36 with the 
standard deviation of 5 nights where same-day discharge is included. For 
overnight or longer separations, the LOS increases to 4.92 with the standard 
deviation of 6.28 nights. These numbers are not substantially different from the 
total hospital system where the average LOS was 2.18 (4.8) and 4.95 (6.21) 
including (excluding) the same-day discharge respectively. 
 
Same day discharge constituted a major bulk of all hospitalization episodes: 52.1 
percent for publicly admitted patients and 56 percent for all hospital admissions, 
including private patients in 2008. The high proportion of same-day admissions 
required a careful approach to how to model LOS behavior – the details are 
discussed in the next section. 
 
Australian Refined Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG)  
The complexity of admission episodes was measured by the DRG cost weights, 
which was calculated as a relative measure relating specific DRGi average cost to 
the average costs of all DRGs. The average cost of all DRGs was normalized to 
unity. In general, the higher the DRG cost-weight the more complex the medical 
conditions associated with the episode and the higher the intensity of hospital 
resource use. The 2008 hospital admissions were based on a version 5.1 of the 
AR-DRG classification system with individual AR-DRGs grouped under 23 
Major Diagnostic Categories (the latter is mostly defined by body system or 
disease type). According to the Productivity Commission Report (2009):  
 
Each separation is assigned to an AR-DRG mainly on the basis of the medical 
diagnosis or surgical procedure involved, but also according to a patient’s age, 
length of stay, mode of separation, the level of clinical complexity and the 
existence of complicating diagnoses or procedures. (p. 32) 
 
The summary statistics of the DRG cost weights is given in Table 1: given the 
average normalized cost-weight of 1, the range of DRG cost weights was between 















types were grouped into separate DRGs depending on whether the admission was 
classified as same-day or longer. Out of 665 individual DRGs there were ten DRG 
groups specifically assigned for the same-day discharge and there were 40 DRG 
groups where admissions were always longer than overnight. The remaining DRG 
groups did not explicitly distinguish between same-day and longer admissions.  
 
Number of Affected Systems 
The dataset contained the information for up to 50 diagnoses for each 
hospitalization episode. Given that less than 10 percent of the sample had more 
than 7 diagnoses, both SES and number of affected systems extraction were based 
on a truncated at seven diagnoses dataset– this did not reduce the efficiency of 
new variables creation since most of diagnoses beyond 7 belong to the same code 
group. 
 
We distinguished between one-, two- and three-(or-more) affected systems. This 
aggregation was derived from the list of diagnoses and based on the ICD-10 
coding system (WHO, 2008). As an illustration, if an admission episode included 
codes I00-I99 which refer to the diseases of the circulatory system, J00-J99 - 
respiratory system and K00-K99 - digestive system, this episode was classified as 
three (-or more) affected systems. Overall, 63 percent of admissions were with 
one affected system, 19.1 with two affected systems and remaining 17.8 were 
complicated cases with three affected systems. As expected, for overnight 
admissions and longer, the proportion of episodes with two- and three affected 
systems increased and accounted for more than 50 percent. 
In the ICD-10 classification the codes R00-R99 ‘symptoms, signs and abnormal 
clinical and laboratory findings, not elsewhere classified’ and S00-T98 ‘injury, 
poisoning and certain other consequences of external causes’ refer to the causes 
of illness rather than bodily systems involved and hence could affect any part of 
human anatomy. The sub-codes in each category were used to assign the 
information contained in the R-T classifications in order to reflect the number of 
systems affected with more accuracy. 
 















Males accounted for 47.5 percent of the admitted public patients and 44.4 percent 
for overnight and longer discharges. The patients were grouped in five-year 
brackets according to their age, with the exception of less than one year old and 
patients older than 65 years old. It is interesting that the proportion of younger 
patients (< 40 years old) increased in longer hospital stays compared to older 
population. 
 
Most of the patients were born in Australia (70.9 percent) and were admitted in 
the hospitals at major cities (61.7 percent); followed by inner regions (21.8) and 
outer region (12.5) admissions. Patients with ATSI background constituted 
approximately 6 percent of the sample.  
 
Additional SES Variables   
To supplement the existing SES characteristics, we used the admission 
information where admission episodes include the Z-codes (Chapter XXI of the 
ICD-10 classification – Factors influencing health status and contact with health 
services, WHO, 2008). These Z-codes, if present, point to economic and/or social 
background of patients. For instance, code Z56 lists problems associated with 
employment or unemployment, while code Z59 includes ‘housing and economic 
circumstances’ problems and/or complications. This information was utilized to 
create an extra set of the SES variables: homeless & housing problems, low 
income and unemployed. Table 1 lists the number of episodes associated with each 
SES characteristic. Even though the proportion of episodes with these 
characteristics was rather small (less than 1 percent of the overall sample), it is 
based on the whole population of hospitalized public patients in Australia in 2008. 
Note that proportion of patients with adverse SES characteristics increased 
somewhat where admissions are longer than overnight. 
 
It is quite plausible that not all admission episodes were accurately and completely 
recorded. Additionally, if a list of diagnoses did not include the Z code, the 
structure of the data would not allow identifying unambiguously if the admission 
episode was not complicated by adverse SES characteristics. We suspected that 
episodes with adverse SES characteristics were underreported. As a quick check, a 















substantially lower than corresponding counterparts for the Australian population 
especially taking into account that the data do not control for readmissions. For 
example, the average unemployment rate for 2007-08 financial year was around 
4.2 percent (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2008) while the proportion of patients 
reporting issues related to unemployment was less than 0.2 percent of all patients. 
Therefore, we estimated the models with and without second set of SES 
characteristics which allows to check the sensitivity of results. Based on the 
diagnosis information it is also possible to identify a wider range of SES 
characteristics which can reflect adverse lifestyle, exposure to stress, various 
employment issues, and exposure to environmental &occupational risks. 
Compared to three chosen SESs, the latter were more subjective and ambiguous, 
thus were not considered in the current version.  
 
2.2. ANALYTIC METHODS 
 
Given the nature of the dependent variable LOS – count data truncated at 35 nights 
with high proportion of the same day discharge (0 nights) – there were two 
frameworks to model its behavior. The first approach was to treat the length of 
stay as a uniform process – one-part modeling (1-PM) framework – where no 
specific treatment was given to the same-day discharges. For this type, either 
Poisson or Negative Binomial (NegBin) family of estimators can be applied. In 
turn, two-part modeling approach (2-PM) treated same day discharges and length 
of stay (for episodes longer than one night) as two separate processes, each being 
affected differently by the explanatory variables. In this case, either Probit or 
Logit estimators can be used to estimate the probability of being discharged on the 
same day of admission and zero-truncated Poisson and NegBin family of 
estimators can further be applied to the second part of the model to analyze the 
determinants of the LOS (more than one night). In this paper we used both 
approaches to assess the impact of SES to the LOS.  
 
Turning to the Poisson versus NegBin estimations: the results presented in this 
paper were based on the NegBinI specification. The Poisson distribution was 
based on the attractive but unlikely applicable to the current data property that 















square-root transformation of the LOS could reduce the variance and hence satisfy 
the assumptions of the Poisson model more fully, we did not proceed with the 
ln(LOS) in this analysis due to a number of reasons including the issues of 
retransformation (see Duan, 1983, Mullahy, 1998, Manning, 1998) and excessive 
same-day discharge in the LOS. 
  
In turn, the Negative Binomial framework addressed the issue of overdispersion. 
In the empirical literature there are two main specifications applied– NegBinI and 
NegBinII. The main difference between the two is the assumption of the 
relationship between variance and mean of the distribution: NegBinI assumes that 
the variance is linearly proportional to the mean and NegBinII further inflates the 
variance as a quadratic function of the mean (which in turn implies that variance is 
increasing as mean is increasing). According to Cameron & Trivedi (1986), if 
𝐸[𝐿𝑂𝑆] = 𝜇(𝑋, 𝛽), then Poisson distribution requires 𝑣𝑎𝑟[𝐿𝑂𝑆] = 𝜇, while for 
the NegBin family 𝑣𝑎𝑟[𝐿𝑂𝑆] = 𝜇 + 𝛿 ∙ 𝜇2−𝑘. NegBinI is obtained when 𝑘 = 1 
and NegBinII with 𝑘 = 0. 
The test of the coefficient allowed to discriminate between Poisson ( 0 ) and 
NegBin distributions, where 0 captures overdispersion.  In all estimations, the 
Poisson model for either 1-PM or 2-PM specifications has been rejected with the 
p-value=0.000. Comparing the NegBinI and the NegBinII models – we favor 
NegBinI with NegBinII overinflating the variance and resulting in a very wide 
range of predicted values. 
  
We estimated and reported average marginal effects (AME). Those were 
reasonably straightforward for the 1-PM: denoting 𝑚𝑘,1𝑃𝑀 =
𝜕𝐸[𝐿𝑂𝑆]
𝜕𝑥𝑘
 as a marginal 
effect with respect to the variable xk, average marginal effects were evaluated at 
each value of xk and then averaged out. Extra steps needed to be taken to obtain 
AME for the 2-PM. Following the literature (Dow and Norton (2003)) the 
conditional mean for the 2-PM was then 𝐸[𝐿𝑂𝑆|𝑥] = Pr [𝑂𝑁 = 1|𝑥1] ×
𝐸[𝐿𝑂𝑆|𝐿𝑂𝑆 > 0, 𝑥2], where x1 and x2 are the sets of explanatory variables for 
staying overnight or longer (ON=1) and LOS. In our case these sets were the same 




















× 𝐸[𝐿𝑂𝑆|𝐿𝑂𝑆 > 0] +
𝜕E [𝐿𝑂𝑆]
𝜕𝑥𝑘
× Pr[𝑂𝑁 = 1] and standard 
errors need to be bootstrapped. 
 
To summarize, 1-PM is estimated with the NegBinI distribution specification. The 
first part of the 2-PM (for the probability to stay longer than overnight) was 
estimated with Probit and the second part of the 2-PM is estimated with truncated 
(at unity) NegBin1 distribution. All calculations were done using STATA/MP 
version 12. Standard errors for the total average marginal effects in 2-PM are 





As was presented in the Methods section above, we estimated the marginal effects of 
the socio-economic (SES) characteristics of the hospitalized patient on the length of 
stay (LOS), controlling for age, gender, DRG-cost weight and the number of 
physiological systems affected by the condition, using two specifications: in the first 
we assume that the LOS decision (the number of inpatient days) is taken in one stage. 
This translates into a 1-PM where “same-day” separations are considered as zero 
inpatient nights. Alternatively, one can think on a two-stage decision, where first a 
binary decision is made whether it is a same-day or over-night separation, and for 
over-night separations, the LOS (hospitalization nights) is determined in a second 
stage. This leads to a 2-PM where we first estimate the probability for zero nights, and 
second – the number of nights conditional on its being positive. 
  
We focused on two sets of SES variables. The basic set includes three characteristics: 
ATS, Australian-born, and remoteness. The enlarged set includes, in addition, three 
types of problems which, we argue, affect length of stay and represent specific SES 
indicators: homelessness – including various housing - problems, low income 
problems and unemployment problems.  
 
Table 2 presents the marginal effects computed for all – medical (columns 1-4), base 















the effects of the clinical variables and of the SES characteristics. We discuss the 
results based on 2-PM estimations and reference to 1-PM is made where the results 
differ between the two approaches. 
 
The clinical variables have, clearly, a major effect on LOS. Every additional DRG-
weight point increases the probability for over-night separations by 0.37. Among 
over-night separations, every additional point increase LOS by 0.26 days. In total, an 
additional DRG-weight point increases the expected LOS by almost 2 nights. The 1-
PM, imposing a constant coefficient for the DRG-weight throughout the range of 
inpatient nights, results in a marginal effect of 0.26 days. The main difference in the 
results is the estimated total marginal effect of the DRG as reflected in the relative 
cost weights: 1-PM specification substantially underestimates this effect; while in the 
2-PM the main impact is absorbed in the probability equation. This does make an 
intuitive sense: in the 2-PM specification the complexity of the admission is 
accounted for by both the probability equation (the more complicated the case, the 
greater is the probability to stay for longer than overnight) and in the LOS equation; 
here the probability equation serves as a screening device separating same day 
discharge from the length of stay. In turn, 1-PM restricts DRG coefficient to be the 
same across same day discharge and longer: given high proportion of short stays that 
reduces the effect. Notice that individual marginal effects are not substantially 
different between the 1-PM results and second equation for the LOS in the 2-PM as 
shown in Table 2. 
 
Similarly, the number of systems affected by the condition, which has led to the 
hospitalization, exercises a sizeable effect on LOS. When two systems are affected, 
relative to the case when only one system is affected, the probability of an over-night 
separation increases by 0.12, and when three systems are affected – by 0.22. The 
marginal effect of the second system affected on LOS among the over-night 
separation is 1.6 days, and that of the third system reaches 4.4 days. The total 
marginal effects on LOS are 1.3 and 3.1 days respectively. We note that the 1-PM 

















Furthermore, Table 2 shows that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island individuals have, 
on average and controlling for the clinical profile, lower LOS. Their probability to be 
hospitalized over-night is lower by 0.04, and if hospitalized overnight, their average 
LOS is shorter by 0.3 days. In total, ATSI individuals have 0.3 (in the 2-PM) and 0.6 
(in the 1-PM) less inpatient days. This is a quite unexpected effect, since we 
anticipated the ATSI individuals to use more inpatient resources when hospitalized 
due to worse health state. A careful look at the data reveals that ATSI individuals 
dominate same day discharge: while 57.4% of ATSI patients were discharged on the 
same day, the corresponding number for non-ATSI patients was lower at 51.9%. This 
phenomenon is largely attributed to a single DRG group (i.e. L61Z Admission for 
Renal Dialysis) with 41.2% of all ATSI patients being admitted under L61Z DRG 
classification compared to 15.9% for non-ATSI. This would explain lower probability 
for ATSI patients of staying longer than overnight. 
 
Individuals living (and hospitalized) in more remote areas stay longer in hospitals. 
Relative to the base category “major city”, individuals in the more remote “inner-
region” have a higher probability for an overnight separation by 0.04, and although 
their LOS is lower by 0.1 days if assigned to an overnight stay, the total effect is 0.14 
days (0.25 using the 1-PM). On the other hand, individuals in the more remote “outer 
regions” have a higher probability (by 0.07) – and hospitalized individuals in “remote 
areas” have a higher probability by 0.1 – to stay overnight. If staying overnight, 
individuals from “remote regions” stay 0.1 more days on average than those from 
“major city”. The total effects of “outer regions’ and ‘remote areas” relative to “major 
city” are 0.31 and 0.55 days respectively, which is slightly lower compared to the one-
part effects (0.47 and 0.76 respectively). 
  
Finally, individuals born in Australia experience shorter LOSs, but albeit statistically 
significant effects magnitude is negligible (0.06-0.08 days in total).  
 
Columns 9-12 in Table 2 present the marginal effects of the clinical and the expanded 
set of the SES characteristics on LOS. Comparing the effects of the overlapping 
variables, we see that the effects are very similar. So, we’ll focus now on the effects 
of the three additional SES characteristics indicating the existence of specific types of 
















In general, the marginal effects of the additional variables on LOS are very strong – 
2.2 to 3 days- and comparable to the effects of the clinical variables discussed above. 
Homelessness (and housing) problems, low income problems and problems related to 
unemployment increase the probability of overnight stay by 0.15, 0.19 and 0.10 
respectively. Once admitted to an overnight stay, the existence of these factors 
increases LOS by 3.5, 2.7, and 5.3 days respectively with the total effects on LOS 
being 2.3, 2.2 and 3 days respectively. The 1-PM marginal effects are of similar 
magnitude – 2.6, 2.3 and 2.7 days respectively.  
 
The diagnostics suggest that two-part model is superior to the one-part as evidenced 
by the BIC and AIC criteria, and the pseudo R-squared for the probability equation is 
about 0.37. Information criteria also agree with the inclusion of additional, both base 




This paper examines whether allocation of resources to hospitals based on DRGs 
alone is sufficient and whether patients’ characteristics, socioeconomic status (SES) in 
particular, explain variations in resource use that should be reflected in the hospitals 
compensation formula. Associations between length of stay (as a proxy for resource 
use) and patient characteristics and DRGs are modelled using a two-part model. The 
results point to the net effect of SES characteristics beyond that of the DRG weights 
which are traditionally used as a measure of inpatient resource use. All SES effects 
are both economically and statistically significant. With the exception  of ATSI 
background, all effects are positive suggesting longer hospital stay and hence more 
intense use of hospital resources. Patients with ATSI background who tend to stay 0.3 
day less on average than other patients. Not surprisingly, the patients coming from 
remote areas tend to stay longer, while patients in the major cities exhibit the shortest 
LOS. Notice that this effect mostly comes from the lower probability in staying 
overnight in the major cities, rather than from the length of stay itself. While the effect 
of being born overseas is statistically significant, the impact on the LOS as measured 
in days is not as substantial.The greatest effects are observed for socially 















with housing problems will stay 2.3-2.6 days longer on average. Perhaps the most 
significant impact is estimated in case of unemployed patients who will extend their 
stay by almost 2.7 – 3 days on average.  
 
Although our estimates offer interesting insights into the Australian health system and 
the hospitals compensation formula we must acknowledge the lack of causal estimates 
from our analysis and the need for caution in putting forward policy 
recommendations. Nevertheless, these effects indicate challenges to both the 
efficiency and the equity of the public inpatient system. From the equity perspective, 
the existence of an SES gradient in the use of public inpatient resources indicates that 
different segments of the Australian population have different use of inpatient 
resources beyond (accepted) variation in clinical conditions.  On the efficiency side, 
allocation of resources among the hospitals, which is based on DRGs alone, penalizes 
hospitals, which serve low SES populations, since their expenditures are higher than 
expected by clinical case-mix. These results point to a SES-related heterogeneity 
within DRGs, which creates incentives to the hospitals to select against the high-cost 
population. This selection might be explicit or implicit and might lead to low quality 
of care and to the under provision of inpatient care.  
 
Data limitations force the analysis to be carried at the episode level omitting controls 
for any hospital- and individual- level fixed effects pushing all such time-invariant 
unobserved factors to the error term. Further, low SES categories could be under-
represented in our dataset implying measurement error for admission episodes. From 
a statistical point of view, non-random measurement error problems (e.g. over- and 
under- reporting problems do occur similarly across the SES distribution) result in 
problematic regression estimates and marginal effects. From an economic perspective, 
if under-reporting is a feature of the system rather than the dataset, it would imply 
differential access to health care resources in the system or possible selection against 
high-cost patients. Unfortunately, this study cannot distinguish between the two but 
whatever the causes, such issues reinforce the message that caution is needed when 
putting forward policy recommendations based on non-causal estimates. Future 
research must look into the replication of such results and their generalizability in 
other contexts (i.e. mixed versus public health care systems) or countries (i.e. 















work should focus on the causal evaluation of the contribution of patient SES 
characteristics towards resource utilization possibly using panel datasets and 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics: Public Patients, Australian Hospitals, acute episodes, 2008 
 
Same-Day discharge included  Overnight or Longer 
 










Characteristics    
 
   
LOS (nights) 3,648,764 2.36 5.00  1,748,405 4.92 6.28 
Same day discharge 1,900,359 52.08  
 
   
















Characteristics    
 
   
Male 1,732,271 47.48 49.94  775,824 44.37 49.68 
Age    
 
   
     <1 year old 60,999 1.68  
 41,605 2.40 
 
       1-4 119,545 3.30  
 68,609 3.96 
 
       5-9 83,077 2.29  
 43,099 2.49 
 
      10-14 72,669 2.01  
 41,234 2.38 
 
      15-19 121,548 3.36  
 70,699 4.08 
 
      20-24 182,272 5.03  
 108,019 6.23 
 
      25-29 218,183 6.02  
 129,745 7.49 
 
      30-34 242,947 6.71  
 138,647 8.00 
 
      35-39 209,045 5.77  
 104,061 6.01 
 
      40-44 207,629 5.73  
 90,364 5.22 
 
      45-49 211,860 5.85  
 85,038 4.91 
 
      50-54 225,537 6.23  
 85,400 4.93 
 
      55-59 251,448 6.94  
 93,115 5.37 
 
      60-64 251,318 6.94  
 95,263 5.50 
 
      65+ 1,164,776 32.15  
 537,569 31.03 
 
SES Characteristics    
 
   
Aboriginal or Torres 
Strait Islander (ATSI) 
216,229 5.93 23.61 
 
92,580 5.30 22.39 
Australian born 2,586,036 70.87 45.43  1,288,552 73.70 44.03 
Major city 2,234,616 61.68 48.62  1,018,782 58.81 49.22 
Inner region 788,520 21.77 41.26  401,830 23.19 42.21 
Outer region 454,422 12.54 33.12  235,524 13.59 34.27 
Remote region 145,304 4.01 19.62  76,334 4.41 20.52 
One affected system 2,299,070 63.01 48.28  796,558 45.56 49.80 
Two affected systems 698,136 19.13 39.34  425,416 24.33 42.91 
Three+ affected sys. 651,558 17.86 38.30  526,431 30.11 45.87 
Homeless & house 
problems 
6,159 0.17 4.11 
 
5,139 0.29 0.00 
Low income 7,321 0.20 4.47  6,379 0.36 6.03 
Unemployed 2,740 0.08 2.74  2,323 0.13 3.64 





 mean and standard deviation is reported for LOS and DRG cost weight; % of total sample observations for 
















Table 2 Marginal and Total Marginal Effects 
 
Medical Base SES 
 
One-part modelling approach 
(1-PM) 
Two-part modelling approach 
(2-PM) 
1-PM 2-PM 1-PM 2-PM 
 






















 * In days    * In days    * In days    
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Male -0.295 -0.271 -0.175 -0.209 -0.300 -0.028 -0.173 -0.213 -0.307 -0.028 -0.183 -0.215 
 











DRG cost weight 0.261 0.382 0.255 1.987 0.260 0.373 0.255 1.942 0.260 0.372 0.258 1.969 
 











2 affected systems 1.346 0.114 1.611 1.335 1.343 0.124 1.612 1.388 1.338 0.123 1.569 1.315 
 











3 or more affected sys 3.905 0.205 4.405 3.071 3.927 0.219 4.407 3.152 3.917 0.218 4.352 3.058 
 











Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander (ATSI)     
-0.616 -0.040 -0.282 -0.332 -0.632 -0.041 -0.329 -0.344 













    
0.250 0.038 -0.106 0.142 0.254 0.038 -0.103 0.142 


































    



























    
0.079 0.005 0.0833 0.063 0.077 0.005 0.0803 0.060 












Homeless and house problems 
        
2.627 0.151 3.455 2.348 








        
2.326 0.187 2.745 2.200 








        
2.701 0.102 5.273 2.957 















































p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
AIC (in 1000s) 12,244 3,143 7,971 11,115 12,227 3,126 7,971 11,097 12,220 3,124 7,968 11,093 




   
0.376 
   
0.377 
  
No. of coefficients 34 33 34 67 39 38 39 77 42 41 42 83 
Notes:  
- Number of observations for the four columns of each specification are: 3,620,044; 3,620,044; 1,730,513 and 3,622,862, respectively 
- Standard errors are in brackets. Standard errors for total Average Marginal Effects (columns 4, 8 and 12) are obtained from bootstrapping (with 200 replications) 
 
